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"Had we but world enough, and time, 
This coyness, lady, were no crime." 
Andrew Marvell, "To His Coy Mistress" 
It was certainly no accident that Repetto (1986) titled his essay on 
conservation management problems World Enough and Time, after Mar- 
veil's lament to his mistress. Today we face global problems of environ- 
mental degradation and extinction that have reached unprecedented pro- 
portions, and time grows ever shorter. Brown (1990;1991) suggests that we 
are witnessing an "illusion of progress": progress because on the surface, 
many of the traditional scourges of mankind are diminishing. We are feed- 
ing more people and increasing standards of living in many places, and we 
have lived through the longest span of economic growth in history. This 
progress is an illusion, Brown argues, because there are high prices at- 
tached to the good fortune: destruction of nonrenewable resources and 
rainforests (e.g., Hecht & Cockburn, 1990), desertification (Chiras, 1988; 
Revetle & Revelle, 1988), increased pest outbreaks and pollution from in- 
creased use of pesticides, fertilizers, and artificial irrigation systems (Re- 
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velle & Revelle, 1988), resource scarcity for much of humanity (Smith, 
1982), global warming (Edgerton, 1991). It is likely that thousands of spe- 
cies will be extirpated before they are even described (Myers, 1984; 
Wilson, 1988). Locally, landfills are being closed because they are simply 
too full. We protest against the dumping of nuclear wastes as we use the 
power from nuclear plants. 
Conventional wisdoms exist about the way humans used resources in 
the past, and our strategies to promote conservation in the face of devastat- 
ing global problems are in part based on these wisdoms. If they are wrong, 
our strategies will not work. These conventional wisdoms include our per- 
ception that people in preindustrial ("traditional") societies, being more 
directly and immediately dependent on the ecology of the natural systems 
around them, were more conserving and respectful of those resources 
(e.g., Bodley, 1990; but see Hames, 1991). Thus, as we have developed 
technological insulation against ecological fluctuations, we feel we have, 
in important ways, "lost touch" with ecological realities and constraints, 
and have, to some degree, lost our respect for them. We also commonly 
think of ourselves, as ethical individuals, giving value to the common 
good; thus, because none of us wishes to cause destruction of resources, 
each of us will accept some level of personal cost to ensure the common 
good. 
If these conventional wisdoms were true, simple information about the 
effects of our actions would be sufficient to solve ecological problems, as 
individuals accept costs for the common good. It should be relatively easy 
to get each of us to accept some small cost for the good of all. Conven- 
tional wisdoms generate normative prescriptions: that we should all be- 
come more reverent, that we need more information about the impact of 
our actions on ecological balances. Yet today we seem trapped, with re- 
peated examples of cases in which we all agree that we need certain solu- 
tions, though we are unable to make ourselves accept the cost: for exam- 
ple, safe storage for hazardous wastes (but "not in my back yard"), 
avoidance of highly toxic chemicals (yet years after DDT was banned in 
the US, we allowed its product ion--and accompanying profi t--for ex- 
port), more recycling as our landfills overflow (yet, in the US we recycle 
only about 13% of solid wastes, and as we show later, most of that is 
material for which we get refunds). 
What is wrong? This litany of environmental problems could be ex- 
panded; that is not our purpose. We can see that our current efforts are 
discouragingly minimal in their effects. We need a new paradigm. The 
examples above, for all their variability in scope, particulars, involvement 
of lesser-developed countries (LDCs) or developed countries (DCs), all 
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have in common an underlying theme, and are all predictable from a be- 
havioral ecological approach to human resource use. 
Here we examine human resource use in a behavioral ecological con- 
text, generating testable predictions about resource use patterns. As we 
explain in the next section, a behavioral ecological approach argues that 
humans, like all other living organisms, evolved to get resources in order 
to survive and reproduce, and that individual and familial wellbeing has 
always been central, while the good of the group has seldom been rele- 
vant. We argue that natural selection has shaped all living organisms to 
exploit resources effectively, in competition with each other, and that our 
problem is that through our cleverness, we have created a novel evolution- 
ary circumstance--we have such technology that the very behaviors we 
evolved to perform are those likely to ruin us. We have evolved, we will 
argue, to maximize short-term rewards that have, in our history, correlated 
with reproductive success. Now these strategies may be harmful, not help- 
ful. If we could simply set aside our evolutionary past, perhaps we could 
easily act as if the earth were our family, regardless of personal rewards. 
But that seems to be difficult (see Hawkes & Charnov, 1988), and today in 
developed countries we have enormous technology for resource exploita- 
tion and high proximate rewards for achieving status and power, giving us 
an ability to cause massive extinctions, deforestation, and global warming. 
Even the crucial problem of overpopulation (e.g., Ehrlich & Ehrlich, 1990) 
arises from individuals satisfying proximate desires. We literally can de- 
stroy the earth to satisfy our proximate goals. 
If we evolved, like all other living things, to be genotypically selfish, 
to strive for resources for ourselves and our kin, then we have evolved to 
apply our considerable intelligence to do just that, and Devil take the hind- 
most. When technology was sufficiently limited, the results were as for 
other species: occasional population explosions, occasional resource con- 
strictions, occasional local extinctions. We have reached a state in which 
our population density and developed technology mean that we can cause 
our own global extinction. We have not evolved to consider the global 
population our family. This is the problem Boulding (1977) tackled when 
he spoke of the difficulties and complexities of building a "pub l ic ' - -a  
large group wil l ing to bear individual costs for a common good. 
A BEHAVIORAL ECOLOGICAL APPROACH 
If human resource use has followed the same behavioral ecological 
rules as other species, people are unlikely to give up short-term individual 
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or familial benefits for long-term societal or global gains, and this is likely 
to have been true throughout our history as a species, rather than a new 
phenomenon associated with technological innovation. This prediction is 
in striking contrast to the conventional wisdoms. 
We know a great deal about the evolution and ecology of resource 
use in other species: the costs and benefits; the influence of environmental 
extremeness, predictability, and patchiness, the evolution of sex differ- 
ences (e.g., Dawkins, 1976, 1982, 1986; Dewsbury, 1978; Wittenberger, 
1981; Daly & Wilson, 1983; AIcock, 1984; Trivers, 1985; Krebs & Davies, 
1991; and specific studies cited therein). The organisms we see today are 
the descendants of those that most successfully survived and reproduced in 
past environments. Strategies for survival and reproduction are all-impor- 
tant, though their appropriate analysis may be complicated. This simple 
logic, first employed explicitly by Darwin (1859, 1871), gives rise to com- 
plex and profound effects. Although only heritable variation is important, 
with complex social animals there can be significant cultural heritability, 
and interaction between cultural and genetic transmission can certainly 
complicate analysis (Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman, 1981; Lumsden & Wilson, 
1981; Boyd & Richerson, 1986; Dawkins, 1986). 
In this large body of theory and empirical data, two things stand out: 
[1] genetically selfish behaviors, those which enhance an individual's re- 
production, are always favored; and [2] fertility responds to the richness, 
controllability and predictability of important resources, and to the sources 
of juvenile mortality. All living things have evolved to acquire and use 
resources to survive and reproduce. The ways they do so are constrained 
by ecological conditions; the most effective and efficient resource strate- 
gies in any particular environment are those that tend to prevail over time. 
Ceteris paribus, those individuals using efficient strategies leave more off- 
spring in the next generation than their competitors. 
Not immediately apparent is that successful reproduction does not 
necessarily mean producing the most offspring, or even the most surviving 
offspring. Even for relatively nonsocial animals, success is seldom 
achieved by the strategy "eat and reproduce all you can." In nonhuman 
species, for example, infanticide, lethal conflict, delayed reproduction, 
sterility (e.g., nonreproductive helpers at the nest, Woolfenden & 
Fitzpatrick, 1984; sterile honeybee workers, Seeley, 1985; infanticide, 
Hausfater & Hrdy, 1984) are all phenomena that at first glance look as 
though they decrease, rather than increase, reproductive success--but fur- 
ther analysis makes it clear that, except for rare pathologies, these behav- 
iors are found in specific ecological and social circumstances, and that 
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their impact is increased lineage success. Each individual has reproductive 
interests, but these interests are shared by other individuals who share 
common genes--genes identical by descent--and thus several avenues 
are open to enhance net reproductive success (inclusive fitness maximiza- 
tion, Hamilton, 1964). We expect organisms, including humans, to engage 
in activities that benefit relatives; the extent to which this is true will de- 
pend on the degree of relatedness. Thus helping relatives, even at some 
cost to oneself, can be genetically profitable. 
Individuals (and their genetic lines) can also prosper through reciproc- 
i ty-cooperat ion (Trivers, 1971). Cooperation can be a highly effective 
competitive strategy. Again, producing the maximum physiologically pos- 
sible number of offspring is not always the best reproductive strategy. 
Humphrey (1983) and Alexander (1971; 1979; 1987) argue that even our 
powerful human intelligence probably evolved in the context of resource 
and mate competition. Reciprocity occurs only in long-lived, social spe- 
cies-species in which individuals recognize each other and are likely to 
interact repeatedly. Organisms in long-lived social species, including hu- 
mans, are likely to do things which benefit potential reciprocators without 
immediate profit, because there is some probability that there will be fu- 
ture interactions between/among the individuals (indirect reciprocity). If 
individuals interact only rarely or occasionally, indirect reciprocity is ex- 
tremely vulnerable to invasion by cheating, and individuals will mirror the 
behavior of others in a "tit-for-tat" manner (I'll start by cooperating, but if 
you default, I will, too; see Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981). When risks are 
high, helping behaviors are likely to occur only or primarily among kin. 
The relevance of these patterns to resource problems (e.g., "not in my 
back yard") should be immediately obvious. It is easy to say strategies 
should be followed, but only if our individual cost is low, or if we see an 
immediate benefit--to ourselves--will we be likely actually to do what we 
say is important. Many behaviors that we call in ordinary parlance "altruis- 
tic" have evolved because they were likely to benefit the inclusive fitness 
of those who did them. Alexander (1974) separated these behaviors in a 
clear fashion; it is obvious that genotypically altruistic behaviors, which 
benefit reproductive competitors at a reproductive cost to the doer, cannot 
evolve through natural selection. While they may occur, they are always 
vulnerable to competition from genotypically selfish (lineage-enhancing) 
behaviors (Table 1). Thus true genotypic altruism, paying a real individual 
and familial cost for the sake of nonrelatives, will remain rare. Only if 
selection worked to favor the group, rather than genetic lineages, would 
genetic altruism be common. 
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TABLE 1 
Categorization of the Impacts of Behaviors on Phenotypic and 
Genotypic Condition (Modified from Alexander 1974). 
Phenotypic Genotypic 







numerous; all overt competition 
parenting, nepotism, reciprocity 
Because Natural Selection Favors Only Ge- 
notypically Profitable Behaviors, Under Natural 
Selection, Behaviors Above the Line Should Be 
Common; Below the Line, Rare 
?? Perhaps a rich miser who disinherits his family, 
leaving an anonymous gift to a home for unwed 
mothers 
Costly Costly Mother Theresa 
("altruistic") ("altruistic") 
In light of this evolutionary background, it should not be surprising 
that ecological conditions change the costs and benefits of helping. For 
example, Minnis (1985, p. 38), in a discussion of preindustrial societies, 
notes that as food stress increases, sharing of food increases to a point, and 
then decreases. In really extreme cases, dependent kin (children) can be 
abandoned (e.g., Boswell, 1988; Turnbull, 1972). Even in good times, 
sharing, as we would predict, is not random; it tends to be directed toward 
kin, and toward individuals from whom the giver might hope to receive 
benefits (Hill & Kaplan, 1988a; Chagnon, 1982; Turke & Betzig, 1986). 
Levels of Selection and Conservation Issues 
To conservationists, the most familiar "levels of selection" problem is 
probably that of the commons (e.g., Hardin, 1968). These are resources to 
which all have access (and which, if destroyed, will hurt all), but which 
give short-term profit to individuals when used exploitatively. Typically, 
when many unrelated individuals simultaneously have access to resources, 
whether the resources are grazing lands or whale populations, they tend to 
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exploit the resource more than is wise from the community's tong-term 
prospective, in order to gain personally. 
Such problems should be rare if our conventional wisdoms were cor- 
rect, and we all felt our interests were identical to those of humans as a 
group--i f  selection were most potent at the level of the group. For exam- 
ple, Wynne-Edwards (1962) and others hoped to find the answer to limited 
population fluctuations of many species in terms of group benefit. He ar- 
gued that individuals behaved in ways that, while costing each individual 
reproductively, helped maintain the population below the carrying capac- 
ity, thus allowing the population to persist through time (true genetic altru- 
ism in Table 1). 
Such an approach has a serious failing. Selection cannot favor individ- 
uals who act for the benefit of a group of nonrelatives at the expense of 
their own inclusive fitness. Situations in which the costs are paid by indi- 
viduals other than those gaining the rewards are unstable. Yet this does not 
mean that we are simply harsh and fierce competitors, with no redeeming 
features. First, and importantly, helping our family and friends, favored by 
individual-level selection, is common (phenotypically altruistic, ge- 
notypically selfish behaviors in Table 1). Sometimes, too, the group may 
appear to benefit as a result of the cumulative selection on individuals 
(e.g., Williams, 1966) even though natural selection has acted on the level 
of the individual. Interestingly, Wynne-Edwards (1962) argued that all spe- 
cies except humans were group-selected, because human populations 
seemed not to be "regulated." He said this because even when he was 
writing, the conflicts between individual profit and group good were al- 
ready clear. In fact, humans alone may show any evidence of group selec- 
tion at all (laws, for example, are inflictions of constraint on individual 
behavior by coalitions of others in the group; Alexander, 1987). 
Although research for some decades now has produced no evidence 
that any organism has evolved to assist unrelated individuals while costing 
the doer, this is not to say such altruistic behaviors will never occur; it is 
just that because they cannot spread by natural selection they will be rare. 
Mother Teresa, Mahatma Gandhi, and the Dalai Lama are/were certainly 
altruistic by any standards. All are noteworthy in part because~they are rare 
exemplars. The obvious outcome to genotypic altruism (Table 1) is that the 
genetic altruists decline in the population, being steadily replaced by indi- 
viduals who behave to their own reproductive benefit. Of the great reli- 
gious leaders mentioned above, only one (the Mahatma) left any known 
descendents. Darwin (1859, p. 260) himself recognized the problem of 
altruism when he stated "if it could be proved that any species does some- 
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thing for the sole good of another species, my theory is annihilated, for 
such could not have evolved by natural selection." 
This particular result of natural selection is absolutely key to under- 
standing human resource use. When we urge, as in the 1970s environmen- 
tal movement, that we should all pay an immediate, relatively small cost 
(e.g., taking shorter showers, taking the trouble to recycle materials), in the 
interests of gaining Iong4erm global benefits, involving nonrelatives and 
competitors, we are asking for behaviors that have no evolutionary prece- 
dent, and could only have arisen through group selection. The result? 
Countless proximate reasons why "it's too much trouble," why "my part 
won't make any difference," and burn-out from those who do undertake 
the short-term costs. In part, we have made mistakes in our scenario-build- 
ing. If we forecast utter doom by some date, we run the risk of people 
imagining it, but then finding, when the time comes, that things are bear- 
able--when that happens, the next gloomy scenario is less potent. And all 
of this complicates the fact that making things "bearable" may involve real 
short-term exploitation, combined with externalization of costs, and this 
cannot be done forever. 
Asking for altruism just has not worked as a widespread strategy. We 
suggest that when short-term gains accompany short-term individual costs, 
results beneficial to the group (e.g., long-term reduction in resource con- 
sumption) are more likely. 
Novel Evolutionary Environments 
In other species and in preindustrial human societies for which we 
have sufficient data, individuals who have more resources typically have 
greater reproductive success. Now, however, we may have broken the link 
between resource accumulation and inclusive fitness (Figure 1). If we 
evolved, like other organisms, to strive for resources, using them for our- 
selves and our families, one powerful corollary is that we typically derive 
proximate rewards of satisfaction and pleasure from that struggle. What we 
perceive has always been some proximate cue like pleasure or pride, al- 
though the reason the behavior persists or dies out is its effect on inclusive 
fitness. Whenever some behavior has an evolutionary history of reproduc- 
tive advantage, and conditions change ("novel evolutionary events"), there 
is a possibility for that behavior to continue being driven by proximate 
cues that in the past correlated with reproductive advantage, even when 
the proximate cues are currently unhinged from that funcitonal advantage. 
We argue that humans are in precisely this situation with regard to the use 
and conservation of resources (Figure lb). 
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FIGURE 1. The role of proximate and ultimate processes in behavior [a] 
in ordinary selective environments; [b] in novel evolutionary 
environments. While ultimate reproductive impacts actually drive the 
striving (arrows), organisms respond to proximate cues (closed loop). 
Thus, in novel evolutionary environments, if the link between proximate 
cues and ultimate reproductive gain is lost, the organism may persist in 
behaviors no longer reproductively profitable. 









B. In novel 
evo lu t ionary  
env i ronments  
There are many cases of novel evolutionary events influencing the 
behavior and demography of animals. For example, Great Tits in Great 
Britain began to feed out of (evolutionarily novel) milk bottles although 
their probing behaviors evolved to forage on bark and twigs (Krebs & 
Davies, 1981); a male chimp in a well-studied group gained status by 
banging empty metal containers together instead of the more traditional 
branches (Goodall, 1986); and gulls which evolved as generalist feeders 
showed marked increases in population density as a result of more garbage 
dumps on the east coast of the United States (Kadlec & Drury, 1968; 
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Drury, 1973), while other seabirds declined in abundance due to gull pre- 
dation (Podolsky 1985). In fact, the most frequent reason that animals be- 
come rare or endangered is that their habitat is altered by humans (Ehrlich 
& Ehrlich, 1981). 
Because no organism, including humans, has evolved to be aware of 
ultimate selective effect, but only of proximate cues, selection acts so that 
those things which enhance our survivorship or reproduction--forming 
friendships, having sex--tend to be perceived as pleasurable, and acts 
which typically detract from our survivorship or reproduction--getting 
burned--are perceived as unpleasant or painful. Consider a simple exam- 
ple of how novelty complicates this process. In nature, sweet foods are 
seldom harmful, and sour and bitter tastes are often correlated with the 
presence of harmful alkaloids. Thus a preference for sweet tastes became 
widespread in omnivores, including humans. In natural situations, it was 
difficult to obtain sufficient sugar without other nutrients and fiber, to cre- 
ate problems of obesity. Once we humans invented technologies for refin- 
ing and concentrating sugar, we created foods that had enormous concen- 
trations of sugar, breaking the selective link between sweet taste, the 
proximate cue, and good food source, which results in enhanced survivor- 
ship and reproduction. But proximate cues drive the system, and selection, 
as a passive sieve, operates. So, we retain a preference for sweet taste that 
is often currently counter-adaptive (health risks, and perhaps sexual selec- 
tion). As noted above, we think humans are in precisely the same situation 
with regard to the use and conservation of resources (Figure 1). 
NATURAL SELECTION AND HUMAN RESOURCE USE 
A behavioral ecological approach makes several predictions about re- 
source use, fertility, mortality, male-female differences, and about how 
those are predicted to differ in various environments. We do not argue that 
particular genes force particular behaviors, and we assume learning is im- 
portant. A variety of proximate mechanisms might mediate any particular 
pattern. We simply ask: Under the described environmental conditions, 
what strategies will be favored (will result in enhanced lineage success) 
compared to alternate strategies? What patterns would we predict as a re- 
sult of specific environmental conditions? 
Ideally, of course, we would like to assemble here a series of tightly 
controlled statistical tests; however, some of these predictions are suffi- 
ciently new that data have not been systematically gathered. Part of our 
purpose here, in fact, is to urge data collection to test these predictions. 
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Here, we [1] examine data from several literatures: cross-cultural, ecologi- 
cal, historical, demographic and economic; and [2] review both systematic 
and simple descriptive data bearing on the hypotheses. We hope to bring 
together the clues that will allow us to falsify these predictions, or to sug- 
gest the kinds of data we need. 
Prediction [11 Resource Types Conservatively Used 
If enhancement of individual and familial survival and reproduction is 
the trait favored by natural selection, in traditional societies, resources 
will be most conservatively used when there is rapid and clear feedback 
regarding the impact on family and individual welfare (when overex- 
ploitation carries clear individual and familial costs). 
Under some conditions, human resource use does not result in re- 
source degradation. Evolutionary theory predicts that these conditions 
would include [1] exclusive management by small groups of relatives and 
neighbors likely to interact for long periods of time, and [2] resource types 
with feedback that allows people to assess what rates of harvest may be 
unsustainable. People in such cases have individual incentives, through 
kin selection and reciprocity, to manage resources conservatively, and they 
have the information to see how their use affects the resource. They are likely 
to have resource-use rules, and punish cheaters (see Ostrom, 1990). 
Small groups of people cooperatively manage Amazonian fisheries; 
such small communities, which are typically made up of relatives and 
neighbors likely to interact over long periods of time, with exclusive or 
near exclusive access to the resource, provide an exception to Hardin's 
"tragedy of the commons." Chapman (1989) discussed the exploitation of 
Amazonian fisheries in the political context of changing relations of com- 
mon and private property resources. She contended that political ideo- 
logies favoring large-scale development and use caused decline of the fish- 
eries through the lack of local control. She argued that this was related to 
variations in the "GINI" coefficient (a measure of inequality in wealth, 
Murdock, 1980; Smith, 1982). Similarly, Bunker (1985)contended that 
extractive economies have led to the enrichment of dominant classes at the 
expense of the poor, and to the depletion of timber and other Amazonian 
resources. Wealth inequalities do seem to be an important concomitant of 
overexploitation; if humans strive to acquire resources to enhance repro- 
ductive success, overexploitation can result as a side effect. In interacting 
groups of kin with exclusive or near-exclusive use of a resource, overex- 
ploitation should be less likely, and sustained harvest may be the best re- 
productive strategy. 
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If control of local resources is removed, it may be in individuals' inter- 
ests to increase exploitation (cf. Dove, 1988; Ostrom, 1990). It is an 
emerging paradigm in the international development literature that the 
most effective management strategy for some natural resources (e.g., tropi- 
cal forests) may be to turn at least some control over to local communities 
(e.g., Pragtong & Thomas, 1990; Peluso et al., 1990). The Nepalese Gov- 
ernment is addressing this to some extent with the Annapurna Conserva- 
tion Area Project, a new kind of protected area for the country, which 
includes a great deal of local participation regarding the use and conserva- 
tion of resources in the heavily visited Annapurna region of central Nepal 
(Hough & Sherpa, 1989). Local control is not a panacea, and external 
markets are important; in another area of the Himalayas, Moench (1989) 
reported that even purely local consumption of forest products in tradi- 
tionally-managed areas can lead to resource degradation, albeit at a much 
slower rate than if all local controls are removed. All of Nepal's existing 
parks and reserves have management conflicts with local people to some 
extent (Heinen and Kattel, 1992). We predict that the more local the con- 
trol within different zones of the reserve, the more sustainable will be the 
management strategy. 
Overexploitation is common when local people are marginalized and 
have no immediate incentive to conserve (e.g., Harrison 1987; Shaw 
1989). McNeely (1988), in a new and provocative view of economics and 
conservation, proposed that various kinds of incentives and disincentives 
implemented at the local level are needed to sustain conservation activities 
in protected areas. Young (1991), Daly and Cobb (1989), and Crowfoot 
and Wondolleck (1990) all contend that incentives are needed by all par- 
ties to assure participation in environmental dispute settlements. Although 
these authors do not address the issue directly, their conclusions are simi- 
lar to ours: People respond most readily to immediate costs and benefits. 
We argue that they do so ultimately because those are the types of rewards 
which led to greater reproductive success throughout our evolutionary his- 
tory. 
These examples all involve relatively homogeneous, stable, local 
communities, often comprising several kin groups and with a preference 
for cousin marriages, in which people are essentially involved in subsis- 
tence use of local resources. In these cases, the exploitation of resources 
for economic profit was initiated by outsiders--central government, for- 
eign investors. In contrast, local control by non-relatives in market econ- 
omies, with highly developed transportation, may not result in the most 
conserving use: We have only to think of the old-growth forest in Oregon, or 
conflict over salmon management and forestry in the Pacific Northwest. In 
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these cases, local individuals may find the "get mine and get out" strategy 
all too tempting. If property rights and market economies allow, some indi- 
viduals may be able to "corner the market," gaining control over the re- 
source, then regulating prices to maximize profit. When this is so, coali- 
tions of others, working through central government agencies, can have a 
moderating influence; but conflicts persist. 
If conservation benefits can be made to outweigh costs for people 
through a system of incentives which confer immediate or short-term bene- 
fits to people and their families, conservation strategies will succeed; if 
not, we argue, they will more often fail. Examples of local incentives in the 
case of protected areas include the sustained removal of some forest prod- 
ucts, or providing employment to villagers. In a similar vein, Repetto 
(1986) suggested promoting conservation strategies that have proven effec- 
tive, mostly by providing benefits to local people (e.g., improved health 
care and lowered infant mortality rates). Other recent volumes on eco- 
nomics and conservation which address the general problem of economic 
valuation of biotic resources are: Prescott-Allen and Prescott-Allen (1987), 
Oldfield (1989), and Dixon and Sherman (1990). These approaches may 
prove important for justifying conservation activities to policy makers, but 
we suspect the activities can only persist with systems of incentives and/or 
benefits to local people such as those discussed by Repetto and McNeely. 
Such systems would approximate the ultimate, evolutionary reward sys- 
tems of human hunter-gatherer societies throughout most of our history. 
Pearson (1985) contended that many multinational corporations are imple- 
menting new policies in LDCs which involve moving away from direct 
ownership of natural resources, and toward contractual relations with lo- 
cally-owned and managed businesses, with the rationale that this will in- 
crease profits over the long term. 
Prediction [2] Resource Destruction in Pre-lndustrial Societies 
Deliberate overexploitation in traditional societies is likely when [a] it 
yields individual genetic profit (and/or its proximate cues, status or 
wealth enhancement), and [b] technology is sufficient to accomplish 
overexploitation. Thus the impact of introduction of more efficient tech- 
nologies will vary, depending on whether their use will result in greater 
(short-term) individual and familial benefit. 
Exceptions to the conventional wisdoms about preindustrial societies' 
resource-use patterns are common. When do they occur? Humans can 
cause destruction or extinction in a variety of ways. They may do so di- 
rectly, as in hunting a species to extinction (e.g., moas in New Zealand). 
20 
POPULATION AND ENVIRONMENT 
Deliberate exploitation is predicted to cause extinction or environmental 
degradation most often when technology is sufficient, individual payoffs 
exist, and feedback on human impact is slow. Throughout most of our 
evolutionary history, these conditions were seldom met, although humans 
have apparently always modified their environment--even hunter-gath- 
erers deliberately changed the environment by burning, for example, and 
there is evidence that tribal people are capable of over-hunting (Clay, 
1988; Bodley, 1990). Typically, however, the technology was not wide- 
spread, and had principally local and limited environmental impacts (but 
see Lowdermilk, 1953). Thus, widespread concern about a conservation 
ethic is more or less a twentieth-century phenomenon (e.g., Spoehr, 1956; 
Hargrove, 1988; Strong, 1988; Callicott, 1989). 
In addition to deliberate exploitation, humans may also introduce 
crop plants or domestic stock, or inadvertent "weeds" or animal pests 
(e.g., rats). Exploitation is most likely to be directly related to individual 
striving, while introductions result more often from a lack of information. 
From the Quarternary, documented extinctions have occurred as a direct 
result of human activity (Martin, 1984). On the Hawaiian Islands, 54% of 
endemic birds went extinct due to activities of early Polynesians (Olson & 
James, 1984), and the same case, better-or-worse documented, can be 
made for most other continents or islands (Martin, 1984). 
Diamond (1984) analyzed factors associated with resource destruction 
and human activity. "Man's arsenal" included weaponry, stock, pigs, 
dogs, swift predators like cats, agriculture. All of these were usually delib- 
erately brought. Rats often accompanied humans inadvertently. Faunal 
susceptibility was an independent consideration, arising from fire risk, ab- 
sence of native swift predators, rats and land crabs, and previous absence 
of humans. Of the four prehistoric extinction waves definitely attributable 
to man, three "resemble what literate Europeans have been doing on nu- 
merous oceanic islands" (Diamond, 1984, p. 852). Patterns of particular 
extinctions varied. In Pleistocene North America, human-caused extinc- 
tions included large mammals, few small mammals, and some relatively 
large birds. 
Though less well known, the late Pleistocene extinctions in South 
America and Australia followed much the same pattern. In New Zealand, 
the Polynesian settlement extinguished all of the giant flightless birds, local 
populations of marine mammals, numerous ~species of both small and large 
flightless and flying birds, frogs, lizards, and flightless insects (Anderson, 
1984; Cassels, 1984; Trotter & McCulloch, 1984), as well as numerous 
plant species (Crosby, 1986). Only part of the pattern is attributable to 
weaponry and hunting, which might be seen as more relevant to human 
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intent. Other impacts arose from introduced stock, predators, and plant 
species, and unwanted commensals like rats. The situation is further com- 
plicated by incomplete information on extinctions, and variability in faunal 
resistance (Diamond, 1984). Current work suggests that the abandonment 
of Mayan cities was related to agricultural failures (Deevey et al., 1979; 
Turner, 1982). Ancient Sri Lankans, by forest clearing on mountainous re- 
gions, created flooding and reservoir siltation (Lowdermilk, 1953), causing 
serious problems. 
Both technological sufficiency and profit are important. In North 
America, Great Lakes Indian societies had sufficient technology to have 
great impact on beaver populations; nonetheless, these populations re- 
mained relatively stable until the Hudson's Bay Company entered the area, 
introducing a market economy, and made extra beaver pelts useful. A 
male beaver pelt, according to company records (Albany Fort, 1773), was 
worth a brass kettle, or twenty steel fishhooks, or two pounds of Brazilian 
tobacco (Newman, 1989, p. 60). In this case, the technology was suffi- 
cient for some time without resulting overexploitation; what was lacking 
was immediate advantage to continued intense hunting. 
Plains Indians who hunted bison were, regardless of the hunting tech- 
nique, highly selective in their use of meat, hides, and other by-products of 
the hunt (Haines, 1970; Speth, 1983), seeking particularly fat and fatty 
meat, and leaving heavy, less nutritious parts at the kill. When cliff jumps 
were used, the hunt could become inefficient in terms of the amount of the 
kill actually used. Cliff jumps produced far more bison meat for less effort 
than competing technologies, but were certainly inefficient, and hardly 
"conserving" in that storage and preservation techniques were inadequate. 
Huge amounts of meat rotted at the base of cliffs; hunters took only the 
choicest meat. In this case, certain technologies were more than adequate; 
others lagged behind. 
Hames (1979, 1989) found that among the Ye'kwana, enhanced tech- 
nology increased hunting efficiency, but did not increase exploitation. 
Game could neither be stored nor traded in a market economy; its avail- 
ability did not lead to feast and famine conditions. Thus, already efficient 
hunters simply had more spare time. When such time is used in male-male 
bonding and negotiations, it may constitute politics, and may indeed have 
some reproductive payoff for individuals (e.g., Hames, 1979; Chagnon, 
1988; Low, 1990a). On the other hand, when steel axes were introduced 
in New Guinea, with a market available (Salisbury, 1962), serious ecologi- 
cal degradation followed. 
One might think that normative beliefs would strongly affect these pat- 
terns. ReliRious beliefs can be an important proximate cause of conserva- 
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tion, although we argue they are unlikely to be very effective if no individ- 
ual or familial benefits accrue. In all major religions it is considered noble 
and just to aspire to poverty or limited resource use of some form (e.g., 
Durning, 1991). In many Asian religions there is a great reverence and 
respect for nature (Callicott & Ames, 1989). The evidence suggests that 
humans the world over behave in a genotypically selfish manner, some- 
times in accord with their religious inculcation, sometimes in spite of it (cf. 
Callicott & Ames, 1989). Although cultural and religious beliefs about im- 
portant affairs may well have considerable inertia, making them slow to 
change, sometimes as slow as genetic algorithms, when environmental 
conditions change, religious beliefs can sometimes be altered rather 
quickly. 
We suspect that protective religious reverence for nature is more 
strongly practiced when kinship structures are strong and families benefit 
from conservative management, and further, that conservation philoso- 
phies relying on generalized and diffuse group benefits (e.g., Lovelock, 
1979; Devall & Sessions, 1985; Taylor, 1986) are probably doomed to 
failure in the absence of individual or kinship benefits to conservative man- 
agement. We would be delighted to be wrong but suspect we are not. In 
most hunting and gathering societies, while religious activities may sur- 
round hunting, men who are good hunters can get more wives, and men's 
attitudes about hunting (and various achievements) center on how hunting 
skill helps their social and reproductive success (e.g., Chagnon, 1988; Low 
1990a, 1992). 
Thus, two conditions apparently must exist for active rather than inci- 
dental environmental degradation to occur: The technology must be suffi- 
cient to accomplish it, and there must be some reward to individuals who, 
for example, hunt or clear land at destructive levels. If, in addition, the 
size of the resource pool is unknown or feedback is slow (e.g., whaling, 
sealing), overexploitation is even more likely. 
Prediction [3] Information and Resource Destruction in the 
Industrial World 
Indirect or incidental damage, as through habitat destruction, is most 
likely when information or feedback about the resource is limited. Even 
when we move from considering traditional societies to modern indus- 
trial conditions, those resources most likely to be over-exploited should 
be those with slow feedback cycles--those on which it is hard to see 
the impact of resource use. This is especially critical for resources in 
which the size of the resource pool is difficult to measure and there are 
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many potential users: many non-renewable resources like coal, oil, gas, 
and pleistocene water deposits, and renewable resources like whales 
and large secretive terrestrial mammals (e.g., many fur-bearers). The 
most profitable individual strategy is "get mine and get out." 
Humans, like other organisms, evolved to use resources primarily for 
individual gain, even when this generates incidental expenses for the 
group. Sometimes the costs to the group as a whole, or to those receiving 
no profit from the resource use, can be dramatic. Our high rate of fossil 
fuel consumption is causing unprecedented pollution problems which con- 
tribute to increasing atmospheric CO2 and possibly to global warming 
(Mintzer, 1987; Renner, 1989), and a series of public health concerns 
(Ogden & Williams, 1989). Gaps in the supply of these fuels raise serious 
concerns for global security (Anonymous 1985). The United States recently 
concluded a ground war in the Persian Gulf, yet the 1991 energy proposal 
from the Bush Administration made no concessions for decreasing foreign 
oil dependence or increasing gas mileage, and few for research and devel- 
opment of alternative fuels. Despite initial concerns about the use of chlo- 
rofluorocarbons in the early 1970s, their potential global consequences 
were ignored until the mid 1980s, when more definitive data made it ap- 
parent that ignoring the problem forever was not an option (Miller & Mint- 
zer, 1986; Shea, 1989). Or consider the whaling industry. Harvests by 
several countries did not abate until the large baleen species, one by one, 
reached commercial, though apparently not biological, extinction (Old- 
field, 1989); that is, until it was no longer profitable to hunt. Over-exploi- 
tation of some resources leading to widespread ecological problems con- 
tinues (e.g., Silver & DeFries, 1990; Hecht & Cockburn, 1990; Miller & 
Tangley, 1991). 
These cases all involve resources in which the size of the pool is diffi- 
cult to measure and/or the costs of profligate use are externalized. Thus, 
the short-term benefits outweigh the short-term costs for users (people in 
DCs, or wealthier people in LDCs) and users have no individual incentive 
to conserve, but strong individual incentives to exploit. 
Waiters (1986) discussed the importance of feedback policies in man- 
aging renewable natural resources. Policies which mandate that harvest 
should decline if there are signs of stock depletion may well be essential 
for sustained harvest. Unfortunately, the quantities (pool size) of many re- 
sources are too poorly known, and the costs of use are so externalized, 
frequently across national boundaries, that adopting such policies at a lo- 
cal or even national level is sometimes not possible. International treatises 
and commissions are probably the only answer, if sufficient incentives can 
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be applied for individual nations to comply. Of course, other more lo- 
calized conservation problems occur in the industrialized nations as well. 
However, the global issues discussed above are largely caused by indus- 
trialized nations and will be, we predict, the most difficult to solve because 
the benefits of industrialization may far outweigh the costs for citizens in 
those nations, and because the costs dissipate over the earth. 
Prediction [4] Sex Differences in Resource Use 
Because of the different shape of mating versus parental return curves 
(Low, 1990a), male and female humans, like other male and female 
mammals, should differ in the amount of resources they strive to ac- 
quire, and the risks they are willing to take: 
[a] Societies in which women's resource-use patterns approximate 
men's should be those societies in which their return curves are similar 
(i.e., matrilineal societies in which a very large amount of resources, 
while not increasing a woman's fertility, may, because she can pass 
them to her son/s, increase her number of grandchildren). 
[b] Because women's reproductive value, related to age, is impor- 
tant in mate selection, while for men, resource control is likely to be 
more important than age (Low, 1989a;b; 1990a;b), women's reproduc- 
tion is unlikely to correlate with wealth, power, or status. Instead, even 
in cultural milieus (such as nineteenth century Sweden (Low, 1989b; 
1990b)) in which marriage ages were late, women who marry earlier 
are likely to have higher lifetime fertility than women who marry later, 
while men's fertility tends to be related to their wealth and/or status, and 
not to their age of marriage. 
[c] Because of the interplay of resource (male) and reproductive 
(female) values, in polygynous societies, men controlling more re- 
sources should marry more (and younger) women than do men with 
fewer resources. Even in monogamous societies, wealthier men may 
marry younger wives with higher reproductive valuo (sensu Fisher, 
1958). 
All of these predictions argue that in most societies, men can benefit 
more directly from resource exploitation, and are likely to be the driving 
force in risky, high-stakes resource garnering. 
Men and women, like other male and female mammals, seek access 
to and control of resources toward somewhat different reproductive ends. 
Men's striving centers around the mating aspects of reproductive effort and 
operates in the community sphere (Whyte, 1978; 1979; Low, 1990a). 
Male resource competition and male-male coalitions are associated with 
status or resource competition (Chagnon, 1979; 1982; 1988), and with 
resources that can be more effectively obtained and protected by groups of 
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males--war, heritable [and of lasting value, some large game. While such 
coalitions are likely to be among brothers, and associated with patrilocal 
residence, more-or-less fluid coalitions of this sort arise among men of 
various relatedness, and among nonrelatives in many societies. Men's co- 
alitions typically are broad-reaching, involve both more risk and higher 
reproductive stakes than women's coalitions, exerting considerable power, 
and controlling significant resources (e.g., Low, 1990a). Coalitions in other 
male and female mammals also follow these patterns. 
Men in most societies for which there is information use resources to 
gain reproductively, typically through polygyny, i.e., additional wives. In 
potygynous human societies (the majority of traditional societies), like 
other mammalian species, variance in male reproduction is relatively high; 
great expenditure and great risk-taking may be profitable (Low, 1989a;b; 
1990a;b). In more than a hundred well-studied societies (Betzig, 1986), 
there are clear formal reproductive rewards for men associated with status: 
High-ranking men have the right to more wives and have significantly 
more children than others. In most societies the relationship is quite 
straightforward: In the Turkmen, Irons (1979 a;b) found that richer men 
had more wives and more children than poorer men. Borgerhoff Mulder 
(1988;1990) found that in the African Kipsigis, richer men married younger 
wives (of higher reproductive value; Fisher, 1958) and produced more 
children than poorer men, although with the introduction of western tech- 
nology and medicine, differentials were reduced. Even in societies such as 
the Yanomam6, in which few physical resources are owned, male kin for 
coalitions represent a resource, and men manipulate kinship terms in ways 
that make more women available for mates, and more powerful men avail- 
able as partners (Chagnon, 1982); men who establish their bravery in re- 
venge raids also have more wives and more children (Chagnon, 1988) so 
that reproductive success is uneven. In the Ache, too, good hunters have 
more children than other men (Hill & Kaplan, 1988 a;b; Hawkes, 1989). 
On the island of Ifaluk, men who hold political power have more wives 
and more children than others (Turke & Betzig, 1985). Even in ostensibly 
monogamous societies, monogamy may be far from absolute. In the Ka- 
lahari Bushmen, living in a resource-limited environment, 5% of the men 
manage to have two wives (Lee, 1979). In 10 of 12 societies reviewed in 
less detail by Hill (1984), resource control enhanced reproductive success. 
There is an intriguing parallel in nonhuman species: In ostensibly monoga- 
mous songbirds, males will sometimes take another mate-- i f  resources are 
abundant (Gowaty et al., 1989). 
For women, sufficient resources to raise healthy children are impor- 
tant, but there is little evidence that control of large amounts of resources 
has enhanced women's reproductive success throughout evolutionary his- 
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tory, or cross-culturally today (Irons, 1979a;b; Borgerhoff Mulder, 1988; 
1990). This is true despite the fact that in many societies, women actually 
provide the majority of the calories to the family's diet. Female-female 
coalitions may arise among female relatives or co-wives, and appear to 
function for the exchange of information (e.g., location of good foraging 
spots), child care, and subsistence-related work (cf. Irons, 1983; Low, 
1990a). Resources garnered are used for offspring, family, and important 
reciprocators, and significant resource control is rare or unknown. These 
coalitions are almost never significant beyond the household boundaries; 
even female solidarity groups tend to be among relatives. Resources 
strongly affect women's reproduction when they are limiting (e.g., malnu- 
trition), but can only be used by women to gain the extraordinary repro- 
ductive success of highly polygynous males (Betzig, 1986) in societies in 
which the descent system allows highly successful women to concentrate 
resources in their sons (Low, 1992). 
In western technological monogamous societies today, including the 
United States, men typically remarry more often than women, and have 
children in second marriages more often than women; when this occurs, 
the society is rendered effectively polygynous (Daly & Wilson, 1983; Hat- 
tung, 1982; Essock-Vitale, 1984). Further, U.S. census data suggest that 
family size increases with a man's income, even when second marriages 
are not considered (Daly & Wilson, 1983, p. 334). When we look within 
societal groups in contemporary society, rather than across nations (e.g., 
Birdsall, 1980), richer men and families (but not women richer through 
their own employment), even today, have larger families (e.g., Voland, 
1990; Hughes, 1986; Flinn, 1986; Daly & Wilson, 1983, p. 334; Mueller, 
1991; Rank, 1989; see review in Low & Clarke, 1992). Some (e.g., Vining, 
1986) have argued that these trends (richer men reproducing more than 
poorer men) are spurious, and that they seem to disappear when popula- 
tion growth stops. However, these analyses (e.g., Vining, 1986, Tables 
2-5) use proxy measures like education rather than resources, and do not 
consider lifetime fertility; they are, at the very least, difficult to interpret. 
Thus even in industrialized societies, the possibility exists that richer men 
may derive immediate familial (reproductive) benefits from their resource 
acquisition. In sum, there are strong evolutionary reasons why, throughout 
our history, men have profited more from large-scale resource exploitation 
than women. 
Prediction [5] Conservation Strategies Likely to Succeed 
If enhancement of individual and familial survival and reproduction is 
the evolutionary context of resource striving, then our strategies for con- 
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vincing people to shift resource use to more conserving patterns must 
appeal to their perceived short-term, familial and local, interests. No 
other species has evolved to behave in the long-term interests of the 
larger group (unless that group comprises only close relatives), at the 
expense of short-term individual and familial interests, and we propose 
that this is also true of humans. 
If humans have evolved to use resources in reproductively selfish 
ways, then the most sucessful conservation strategies will be those whose 
benefits to individuals can be made to outweigh costs, through a system of 
economic or social incentives which confer immediate or very short-term 
benefits to individuals and/or their families and friends. If this is the case, 
governments and organizations may find it productive to implement poli- 
cies that create systems of incentives to conserve; the more immediate and 
local the benefit, the more successful should be the outcome. 
The actual monetary value of the proximate rewards need not be 
great. Consider, for example, "bucket" drives to collect money for various 
causes on the campus of a major university. Our argument suggests people 
will be more likely to give to a bucket drive if they get some immediate 
reward such as a pin or tag indicating that they gave. There are two re- 
wards-- the pin advertises the giver's generosity (which may elicit reciproc- 
ity) to everyone and also warns other bucket collectors not to bother the 
giver again. To test this hypothesis, we interviewed students on the main 
campus of the University of Michigan, asking them to which drives they 
gave, and whether they received some sort of tag or pin for their gift. 
Students were much more likely to give to drives in which a pin or tag is 
provided (n = 84, X 2= 8.4, p<O.01). Yet the cost of each tag is a fraction 
of a cent, and most donors give a dollar or more. The American Red Cross 
uses a similar strategy during blood drives; pins are given which advertise 
"be nice to me: I gave blood today." Blood donors can aspire to become a 
"one gallon donor" or a "five gallon donor" with more badges (i.e., pins 
are given for each additional gallon, advertising the number of gallons 
donated). Other factors may operate in this case. Barbara Pate (personal 
communication), Regional Representative for the American Red Cross in 
Washtenaw County, Michigan, reports that the main reason people state 
for giving blood is that a friend or relative was in an accident or had an 
operation, and thus needed blood; people appear to be reciprocating con- 
sciously. 
We are asking what people actually do, given the costs (a few bucks 
or a pint of blood) and the benefits (nothing versus a tag to advertise one's 
goodness, or help to a friend or relative versus help to a stranger), in such 
generalized reciprocity situations; this may provide clues for eliciting more 
widespread forms of conservation activities. We argue that, while many 
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proximate motivations can prompt behavior, the greater the immediate in- 
dividual benefit, or the lower the immediate individual cost, the more 
likely the behavior will be. The Peace Corps actively offers and advertises 
all of these direct benefits to prospective recruits. Beyond direct monetary 
incentives, the organization offers travel opportunities, challenges, oppor- 
tunities for personal growth, and preprofessional experiences not available 
to most people in our society, resulting in greater employability. This or- 
ganization uses extremely effective techniques, predictable from a evolu- 
tionary/behavioral approach, by developing direct and indirect incentives 
that appeal for many reasons to talented people to serve basic needs of the 
poor in lesser-developed countries; the Peace Corps seems to us an excel- 
lent example of promoting group-level benefits through offsetting some 
personal costs with individual benefits. 
Other examples are closer to home. Consider the recycling of bottles 
in states with and without "bottle bills." Many communities in states with- 
out such bills have voluntary recycling centers, but few people use them. 
The cost of stopping at a center on the way somewhere is trivial, yet it is a 
cost that apparently few of us are willing to incur. We predict that the rate 
of recycling of the same bottles in states with bottle bills is much greater, 
probably approaching 100%, though the incentive is also seemingly rather 
trivial ($0.05 to $0.10 US for cans and bottles in the state of Michigan). For 
example, the Ann Arbor Ecology Center (personal communication) reports 
that over 90% of redeemable beverage containers are returned by the 
buyer in states with bottle bills such as Michigan; this is reported to be the 
most effective type of recycling program. A small monetary reward (or fine 
if one does not collect) is sufficient to bring the point (and the bottles) 
home. Furthermore, in areas where people have to pay for garbage dis- 
posal on a volumetric basis, and recycling is provided free of charge, 
though not mandatory, up to 90% of households do at least some recyc- 
ling. Compare this to the approximately 23% participation in cities like 
Ann Arbor, Michigan, in which there was free voluntary curbside recyc- 
ling, but garbage fees were assessed per household, not on a volumetric 
basis (the laws in Ann Arbor have been changed recently, and recycling is 
now over 80%). People are much more likely to recycle bottles and cans 
redeemable for even a trivial reward (Figure 2). The lessons from these 
minor examples should be obvious for states or municipalities wishing to 
reduce solid wastes as landfills reach capacity (e.g., Young, 1991): people 
are more likely to take part in programs whose benefits are societal if they 
have direct individual incentives (Rathje & Murphy, 1992). These benefits 
do not have to reach economic parity; often, rewards that would be ridicu- 
lously small in any economic analysis can be effective. 
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FIGURE 2. For most materials, whether recycling occurred depended on 
whether a refund was offered. Organic materials were defined as recycled 
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Can we apply the same principles to wider-ranging resource issues? 
The most difficult resource-use problems have the following characteris- 
tics: resource base inadequately known and feedback slow, used by many, 
unrelated individuals, and externalized costs. Even in these cases, if incen- 
tives can be provided to individuals we expect use patterns to change. 
Monetary incentives, as we noted, need not be great. If the problem is 
sufficiently immediate--affecting individuals, and in the short-term-- 
other, nonmonetary incentives can be effective, especially if they play on 
our evolved psychological mechanisms. Most frequently studied proximate 
motivators are: education, and intrinsic and social motivation (e.g., De- 
Young, 1985; Kaplan & Kaplan, 1982; DeYoung & Kaplan, 1988; Monroe 
& Kaplan, 1988; and Stapp et at., 1988). Educational techniques seek to 
change behavior by increasing understanding/information about the impact 
30 
POPULATION AND ENVIRONMENT 
of behavior. Several components are felt to be necessary: awareness, 
knowledge, attitude modification, skills and participation (Monroe & Kap- 
lan, 1988; Stapp et al., 1988). Feedback (including information about im- 
pact and implicit goals) has been very effective in promoting energy con- 
servation (Seligman et al., 1981). However, the overall effectiveness of 
information on encouraging conservation is unresolved. DeYoung (1989) 
found information on recycling procedures to be very effective; while Hop- 
per et al. (1991) found that although information increased recycling be- 
havior, it was less effective than other strategies. 
The most intractable resource abuse examples involve slow feedback 
cycles and sparse or unreliable information; we also would argue that 
problems like local recycling efforts (which have some relatively immedi- 
ate and personal costs and benefits) would be more easily tackled with 
educational efforts and appeals to help the community by "doing the right 
thing" than, for example, drought in Ethiopia or the price of gasoline. The 
cost of gasoline is currently much greater (three to six times) in Europe 
versus the United States of America; use per capita in Europe is much 
lower, as a consequence of price, distances between living and working 
places and availability of alternative transportation. In the United States, 
we are certainly aware of the problem, but it is obviously politically diffi- 
cult to pass new taxes in the United States (for precisely the reasons we 
have outlined). The recent analysis of energy policy by Cowhey (1985) is a 
sterling example of crisis policy management in the face of conflicts of 
interest at a number of levels: government, individual politician, company 
CEOs. For the reasons Cowhey gives it would be difficult to raises gas taxes 
even though it is clear that if this were done, incentives for alternative 
energy sources and alternative (mass) transit would be created. The diffi- 
culty in this case would be to convince voters and members of Congress 
from the industrialized states to pass such a tax, due to the immediate costs 
of taxation to consumers and to the auto industry; the immediate individ- 
ual costs to a politician promoting tax increases are seldom seen as coun- 
terbalanced by the Iongterm societal gain. Such an attempt would internal- 
ize the costs of fossil fuels and reduce consumption by forcing consumers 
to pay immediate costs. 
This part of the process is difficult to achieve, and more difficult the 
larger and more diverse the society, because it requires coalitions of indi- 
viduals willing to impose costs on themselves as well as on others in the 
short term. As Daly and Cobb (1989) pointed out, the rational behavior of 
an individual, given the current incentive system, is not necessarily a ratio- 
nal policy for society as a whole. With these complex problems, the ques- 
tion then becomes how to change incentives so that individuals will will- 
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ingly behave in ways that benefit society, or how to foster coalitions (e.g., 
to pass "green fees") which will force us to act in our longer-term interests. 
CONCLUSIONS:  W H A T  CAN WE DO? 
If conventional wisdoms were true, resource abuse would increase 
with degree of technology, and information about the effects of our actions 
would be sufficient to solve ecological problems, as individuals accepted 
costs for the common good. Information appropriate for analyzing these 
complex problems is scattered, and often it is difficult or impossible to 
accomplish the level of analysis we would wish. Yet it is clear that neither 
of the predictions from conventional wisdom are supported: Resource 
abuse sometimes accompanies technological innovation, but only if indi- 
viduals can benefit in the short term. When shifts in cultural values occur, 
they are secondary. Of conservation efforts in the last twenty years, those 
based solely on information are arguably less successful than those incor- 
porating an individual cost-benefit leverage. Note, though, that, partic- 
ularly at local levels, advertising social costs and benefits--e.g., "doing 
the right th ing"--can be effective. Thus, education seems most effective 
when employed on relatively local problems, problems with individual 
costs and benefits (e.g., recycling and landfills). 
The principal alternative to our conventional wisdom, the behavioral 
ecological paradigm, suggests that our complex human intelligence, like 
our cooperative behavior, evolved in competition with other human 
groups, and has always been directed toward our own familial short-term 
benefit--even when we can see clearly that Iongterm societal, or even 
global, detriment may result. 
The behavioral ecological paradigm predicts that one effective way to 
change patterns of resource use is to examine people's perceived short- 
term benefits and play on those, creating individual (and corporate) short- 
term benefits (for compliance), or costs (for defection) in cases in which the 
behavior will have long-term societal benefit. At one level, the logic we 
propose, that individuals calculate (though not necessarily consciously) 
their benefits and costs in any action, has been said or implied by others 
(e.g., McNeely, 1988; and many entries in Hardin & Baden, 1977). 
We argue that the cost and benefit (~urrencies were not originally, and 
need not be, monetary. Our costs and benefits as a social primate are older 
than the invention of barter and money, although not older than family 
structure and reciprocity. If we are right, some solutions may come more 
easily than if we had to rely solely on economic levers; potentially impor- 
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tant rewards include advertising one's status as a good cooperator. We 
evolved as a highly social species, and reciprocity is a powerful force, one 
we have probably underestimated in our attempts to encourage such be- 
haviors as recycling. Even our brief review above suggests this. It may even 
be possible to manipulate an extension of our definitions of "family" or 
shared interest in real ways, to the benefit of conservation programs. These 
techniques have been extraordinarily successful in the service of other 
ends (e.g., training for warfare; Holmes, 1985). Throughout our evolution- 
ary history, most conflicts were fought by individuals or small groups of 
related men, and most conflicts were fought over reproductively important 
matters (Manson & Wrangham, 1991 ; Low, in press). It is not coincidental 
that successful training eliminates many differences in appearance with 
haircuts and uniforms; that it uses kinship and reciprocity terms; that units 
are trained and moved together so that one's life depends on men one 
knows (with notable failures like Vietnam, where individuals were rotated; 
Hackworth, 1989). In short, training mimics the kin warfare situation of 
our evolutionary past. If we can call more widely on analogous strategies 
in the service of conservation (e.g., Peace Corps, Conservation Corps), 
perhaps we can add a powerful strategy producing group-level benefits. 
How can we foster strong normative conservation ethics, if we wish 
to? Williams (1989) called evolution "immoral," because it fosters the traits 
we described. While we would call natural selection amoral, because the 
traits it favors in all living organisms evolved long before, and outside the 
context of, our cultural perceptions of them, Williams makes an important 
point: If we try to overlook the fact that selection uniformly favors ge- 
notypically selfish behavior, we have no hope of countering these pres- 
sures. The only strategies likely to work consistently are those that manipu- 
late individual, familial, and reciprocal costs and benefits. It is time to 
examine what such costs and benefits might be. 
Defining manageable portions of the problems to be tackled ("think 
globally, act locally") seems to be an important strategic device, related to 
our evolutionary past in small groups with shared interests. As we have 
argued, shared interests are key. It is simply too overwhelming to think 
concurrently of whole litanies of problems, like the lists we made in our 
introduction; our response is to sink into passive despair. As Weick (1984) 
noted, such litanies disable the very resources of thought and action neces- 
sary to change them. Instead, he argues, building a series of "small wins" 
creates a sense of control, reduces frustration and anxiety, and fosters con- 
tinued enthusiasm. Ostrom (1990, p. 90) summarizes the traits of success- 
ful cooperative groups. 
Information about the effects of our behavior is obviously important; 
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ultimately, self-interest dictates avoiding our own destruction. However, 
probably because of the great changes in the scope of time and space 
involved, our recent history suggests that information alone will not be 
sufficient to change people's behavior. If the change is seen as costly in 
individual time, money, or even attention, more than simple information 
may be required to effect change. Many solutions to resource problems 
may lie in adopting conservation strategies that provide direct individual or 
familial benefits, or advertisements to potential reciprocators, as well as 
monetary advantages. 
Because of our inescapable history as a long-lived, social primate, we 
also possess evolved proximate mechanisms to maximize our functioning 
in the social context. If we can play upon these evolved mechanisms, 
again, we may be able to promote conservation strategies more effectively 
than if we require conscious cost-benefit calculations, or rely solely upon 
economic costs and benefits. 
Because cultural transmission is so very important (though not unique) 
in humans (e.g., Lumsden & Wilson, 1981; Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman, 
1981; Boyd & Richerson, 1985, Hamilton, 1975), we have evolved to be 
"docile"--disposed to be taught (Simon 1990). Though there are sex differ- 
ences in the intensity of training to be obedient, even boys in highly poly- 
gynous societies in which ferocity and aggression abound are taught to 
obey their elders (Low, 1989a). Thus it will not surprise us that children 
raised in a conservation ethic might, as adults, find it less onerous than 
their parents did to perform slightly (phenotypically) costly behaviors 
which will have a longer-term benefit for the group. Similarly, the promo- 
tion of conservation ethics as a social norm (if one "ought" to do it, it can 
be socially costly to defect; e.g., Myers, 1990) may be helpful. 
If we can "think globally, act locally," not only can problems be made 
more manageable, but the strong forces of social norms (including coer- 
sion through legal means) and reciprocity may be brought into play. That 
is, among non-relatives, our neighbors are those with whom we are most 
likely both to have had (socially) profitable reciprocal relationships, and 
those on whom we are least likely to defect (e.g., in tit-for-tat games, re- 
peated interaction is important; Axelrod and Hamilton 1981, Axelrod, 
1984, Axelrod and Dion, 1988). As we promote a normative standard re- 
garding conservation, compliance is likelty to be higher the better we 
know, the more we interact ~,ith, and the more affected are our neighbors 
(the well-known "bystander effect" [Latane and Rodin, 1969] notes that 
when there are sufficient bystanders, people defect--their chance of re- 
maining anonymous is greater). Information, reciprocal interactions, and 
promotion of social norms, are all likely to be more effective when trans- 
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lated into local scenarios with immediate payoffs. The more remote or 
uncertain are future benefits, the more we "discount"--the difficulties of 
solving problems increase with anonymity, separation of costs and benefits 
across individuals, time, and space (see Heinen and Low, 1992; Hannon, 
1987; Fuchs, 1983; Cropper et al., 1991). How much time do we have? If 
it takes a generation or two to create socially altruistic, group-benefit ori- 
ented individuals, what will remain for them to save? We need to work in 
both the short and long term, using both economic and social costs and 
benefits, and designing education and social norm strategies on the most 
local scale we can. 
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